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INTRODUCTION 
The federal scheme of antidiscrimination law seeks to eliminate 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities by providing strong 
and enforceable standards addressing discrimination, and playing a 
central role in enforcing those standards.1 The Fifth Circuit in Ivy v. 
Williams2 created a gaping loophole through which state agencies can 
avoid their obligation to comply with federal mandates to protect 
against discrimination of qualified individuals with disabilities.3 
Donnika Ivy, the original Plaintiff in Ivy v. Williams, was a 
completely deaf twenty-one year old at the time of suit, whose primary 
means of communication was American Sign Language (ASL).4 The 
Texas Transportation Code required she obtain a certificate indicating 
she completed a driver education course to obtain a license,5 but the 
schools offering that course would not accommodate her with an ASL 
interpreter.6 The Fifth Circuit ultimately held the required course was 
not a federal “service, program, or activity,” and so distribution of that 
service need not comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA).7 
Copyright © 2017 Tara Knapp.
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1.  See Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012). 
2.  Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., Ivy v. Morath, 136
S. Ct. 2545 (2016), vacated and remanded sub nom., Ivy v. Morath, 137 S. Ct. 414 (2016). 
3.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 258; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 
(2012). 
4.  Joint Appendix at 17, Morath, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (No. 15-486).
5.  See 7 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 521.142(d), 521.1601 (West 2015).
6.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 18.
7.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 255.
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The Plaintiffs appealed Ivy v. Williams to the Supreme Court of the 
United States as Ivy v. Morath. Under the Fifth Circuit decision, state 
agencies could license portions of their services to private companies, 
and consequently avoid contracting liability for the discriminatory 
carrying-out of those services.8 This contravenes their federal 
antidiscrimination obligations.9 Title II of the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act prohibit discrimination against those with 
disabilities in “services, programs, or activities” of a public entity,10 and 
in Ivy v. Williams, the Fifth Circuit construed these “services, programs, 
or activities” in a devastatingly narrow manner. The Fifth Circuit held 
that the distribution of drivers’ certificates are not a service of the Texas 
Education Agency (TEA), and thus their distribution need not comply 
with Title II.11 The circuit court acknowledged the question is close, and 
the statutes, regulations, and case law provide little guidance in coming 
to this determination.12  
The Fifth Circuit’s holding that the TEA is not responsible for 
ensuring driver education schools do not discriminate—because the 
schools are not providing a TEA service—was erroneous, because the 
facts indicate the schools are providing a TEA “service.” The facts of 
Ivy v. Morath ground the argument that the “services, programs, or 
activities” of a public agency must include the undertakings of its direct 
licensees when the licensees are the sole providers of the service, and 
the service is absolutely necessary to obtaining a right with “unique and 
indispensable importance.”13 The Fifth Circuit inappropriately 
divorced procurement of certificates necessary to obtain drivers’ 
licenses from the TEA-regulated driver education program, thus 
absolving the TEA from functionally complying with federal law. 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit 
decision, with instructions to dismiss it as moot14 because the “five 
plaintiffs had either completed driver’s education courses or moved out 
of state.”15 The lack of a merit-based dismissal indicates the substantive 
 
 8.  See id. at 256 (stating public entities are not accountable for discrimination by their 
licensees if the practice is not the result of the public entities’ requirements, and here, the practice 
is not the result of TEA requirements). 
 9.  42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794. 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 255. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 259. 
 14.  Ivy v. Morath, 137 S. Ct. 414, (2016); SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES BLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ivy-v-morath/ (last visited November 1, 2016). 
 15.  Jim Malewitz, U.S. Supreme Court orders dismissal of deaf Texans’ suit against state, 
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issues underlying Ivy v. Morath are worthy of consideration. A future 
case need not address the issue in the context of Texas drivers; instead, 
Supreme Court language more clearly defining the “services, programs, 
or activities” of public entities will crucially add to the broader 
jurisprudence addressing public accommodations through licensing. 
This Commentary will progress using the facts underlying Ivy v. 
Morath to illustrate a set of circumstances where private entity activity 
is fairly attributable to a public entity, and thus must comply with 
federal antidiscrimination law. Part I presents the facts and procedural 
posture of Ivy v. Morath. Part II outlines the legal background of what 
programs are subject to federal regulation in the context of the federal 
prohibition against discrimination based on disability in the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act. Part III explains the Fifth Circuit’s majority holding 
and the dissenting opinion in Ivy v. Williams. Part IV examines how the 
Fifth Circuit construed the ADA in an unnaturally constrictive and 
prohibitive manner. Part V indicates the necessity of honoring 
Congress’s intent to prohibit discrimination and the necessity of 
looking holistically at the relationship between the TEA and driver 
education schools in Texas to determine which school activities are 
fairly attributable to the TEA. 
To allow a public agency to avoid ADA compliance based upon the 
label of its relationship with its licensee would directly controvert 
Congress’s intent to eliminate discrimination. A future case, similar to 
Ivy v. Morath, could more clearly define the type of relationship 
between a public agency and a private entity that invokes dual 
obligations to accommodate.16 A distinction without any practical 
difference should not undermine the worthy and indispensable goal of 
eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities in 
receiving government services. 
I.  FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
In Texas, drivers under twenty-five years old are barred from 
obtaining drivers’ licenses without driver education certificates.17 One 
may only obtain a certificate from a private driver education school 
 
TEXAS TRIBUNE (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/11/01/us-supreme-court-
orders-dismissal-deaf-texans-suit/. 
 16.  Dual obligations to accommodate refer to the obligation for a private entity to comply 
with both ADA Title II, which covers public entities, and ADA Title III, which covers the 
obligations for public accommodations, commercial facilities, and certain private entities. 
 17.  7 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.1601 (West 2015). 
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licensed by the TEA.18 If the private driver education school-issued 
certificates are a service of the TEA, then the TEA as a public entity is 
required to assure these certificates are not issued on a discriminatory 
basis.19 Many of these private driver education schools effectively 
refuse to issue certificates to deaf people by failing to provide ASL 
accommodations, thus preventing young drivers from obtaining 
drivers’ licenses.20 
At the time of her original suit, Donnika Ivy was a completely deaf 
twenty-one year old living in Texas who used ASL as her primary 
means of communication.21 In March 2010, Texas law required those 
under twenty-five years old who were applying for their first license to 
take a driver education course and obtain a TEA-issued driver 
education certificate of completion.22 Thus, in order for Ivy to obtain a 
driver’s license, she had to get a certificate from a TEA-licensed driving 
school. Ivy sought a driving school that would provide a sign language 
interpreter, as this was the only means by which she would be able to 
complete a TEA-approved driver education course.23 Ivy called 
numerous driving schools in Texas in May 2010, and again in May 2011 
to request an interpreter, and was repeatedly denied her request by the 
schools.24 Ivy was unable to secure consistent employment or complete 
her college education because she could not obtain a driver’s license—
an obstacle brought about by the refusal of the Texas driving schools to 
accommodate her with an interpreter, and the TEA failing to ensure 
this accommodation.25 
In May 2010, Ivy contacted a deaf resource specialist who informed 
the TEA of the inability of deaf people to obtain the certificates 
required to get drivers’ licenses.26 The TEA refused to intervene and 
enforce the ADA and Rehabilitation Act unless the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) determined individual driver education 
schools violated the ADA.27 The TEA’s refusal to acknowledge an 
 
 18.  5 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 1001.055 (West 2015). 
 19.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). 
 20.  See Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 21.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 17. 
 22.  7 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 521.142(d), 521.1601. 
 23.  See id. § 521.1601. 
 24.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 18. 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  Id. at 21. 
 27.  Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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affirmative responsibility to assure driver education school compliance 
with federal law sparked this suit. 
Ivy originally filed suit in August 2011 against both driver education 
schools and then-TEA Commissioner Robert Scott “for failing to 
reasonably accommodate her disability in approved driver’s education 
programs,” in violation of Title II of the ADA, the 1973 Rehabilitation 
Act, and Title V of the Texas Education Code.28 The complaint was 
amended to assert claims “on behalf of a class of all similarly-situated 
persons in order to obtain the full injunctive and declaratory judgment 
relief to which the individual class members are entitled.”29 The 
resultant class action was a suit against the next TEA Commissioner, 
Michael Williams, asking the court to declare that the TEA must “make 
certain that the hearing disabled have access to mandatory driver 
education courses.”30 The named Plaintiffs were all deaf people living 
in Texas between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five who contacted 
numerous TEA-licensed driver education schools and were denied 
accommodations for their disabilities.31 The lack of accommodations 
precluded these individuals from taking the driving course mandatory 
to earn a certificate, and thus they could not obtain drivers’ licenses.32 
Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court requesting injunctive and 
declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring driver education into 
compliance with the ADA.33 The TEA filed a motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.34 The district court denied 
the TEA’s motions to dismiss, certified the case’s order for 
interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and stayed the case.35 While 
the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did have standing to sue the 
TEA, it reversed the district court’s order denying the TEA’s motion 
to dismiss because it found the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.36 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the case 
with prejudice,37 and the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for 
 
 28.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 5 Tex. Educ. Code § 
1001.001 et seq. (West 2015). 
 29.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 33–34. 
 30.  Id. at 64. 
 31.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 252. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 66. 
 34.  Id. at 1. 
 35.  Id. at 8. 
 36.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 253. 
 37.  Id. at 258.  
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writ of certiorari. 38 The Court granted certiorari in June 2016 and 
replaced the TEA Commissioner with Mike Morath in his official 
capacity as Texas Commissioner of Education as the Defendant.39 The 
Court then vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit decision with 
instructions to dismiss it as moot because of the technicality that the 
named plaintiffs had moved out of state or completed a driving course 
by November 2016.40 Ivy v. Morath’s ultimate dismissal was based on 
the lack of plaintiffs, which has left the underlying substantive 
determination of what circumstances force a private entity to dually 
accommodate under Title II undefined. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under Title II of the ADA, no disabled person shall be “excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity” because of his or her disability.41 Similarly, the 
Rehabilitation Act requires nondiscrimination in federally funded 
grants and programs by declaring that those with disabilities shall not 
be excluded from participating in, or denied the benefits of, any 
program conducted by an executive agency or receiving federal money, 
based on their diability.42 The ADA was statutorily meant to “establish 
a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
disability,”43 and the Rehabilitation Act’s almost identical language 
reflects the same broad congressional objective.44 
The meaning of the ADA statute depends on determining which 
services, programs, and activities federally guarantee non-
discrimination on the basis of disability, and thus require reasonable 
public accommodations to make them accessible. The ADA defines 
“[p]ublic entity” as “any department, agency, special purpose district, 
or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”45 The 
ADA defines “[q]ualified individual with a disability” as an individual 
with a disability who, with reasonable modifications to policies, the 
removal of communication barriers, or the “provision of auxiliary aids 
 
 38.  Ivy v. Morath, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Malewitz, supra note 15. 
 41.  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). 
 42.  29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
 43.  42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
 44.  29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 45.  42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 
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and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt 
of services or the participation in programs or activities.”46 However, 
the ADA fails to clearly define the “services, programs, or activities” to 
which it intends to protect non-discriminatory access. The definition of 
the services, programs, and activities that are federally required to 
guarantee non-discriminatory access will determine whether private 
driving schools in cases like Ivy v. Morath are required to conform to 
Title II standards. If the driver certificates issued solely by driver 
education schools are found to be part of the TEA’s driver education 
program—the program of a public entity—then the schools must 
conform to Title II despite their private status. 
A.  Services, Programs, or Activities 
In Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey,47 the Supreme Court 
interpreted the benefits of the “services, programs, or activities” of a 
public entity to mean the “services, programs, or activities” that the 
public entity provides.48 To determine the meaning of a statute, courts 
consider its “language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.”49 
In plain terms, this means a particular service, program, or activity 
would not be available if the public entity did not make it so. Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary defines “provide” as “to make (something) 
available,” supporting an expansive interpretation of when a public 
entity has “provided” something.50 This commonly understood 
definition does not constrain provision to something provided directly. 
Thus, indirect provision of a service, program, or activity is firmly within 
its scope. 
There is limited Supreme Court case law defining which services 
are “provided” by public entities, however, the Second, Third, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have broadly interpreted the concept to include 
“anything a public entity does.”51 The language has been interpreted as 
 
 46.  Id. § 12131(2). 
 47.  524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
 48.  See id. at 210 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 580 (1984)) (referring to “contact 
visitation program”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 552 (1984) (discussing “rehabilitative 
programs and services”); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 246 (1983) (referring to “appropriate 
correctional programs for all offenders”). 
 49.  Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). 
 50.  Provide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1996). 
 51.  See Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Lee v. 
City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 
(6th Cir. 1998); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(reasoning that the phrase “programs, services, or activities” is “a catch-all phrase that prohibits 
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“a catch-all phrase,” meant to encompass “virtually everything that a 
public entity does.”52 
The Rehabilitation Act supports this broad construction of the 
ADA, and Congress has instructed the ADA be interpreted 
consistently with the Rehabilitation Act.53 Though the ADA leaves 
“services, programs, or activities” undefined, the Rehabilitation Act 
defines “program or activity,” as “all the operations of” a public entity.54 
The plain meaning of operation further strengthens the broad 
construction of the ADA’s bearing on services and programs by 
expanding the definition of what an entity does to all of its operations.55 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “operation” as “performance of 
a practical work or of something involving the practical application of 
principles or processes.”56 Under this interpretation, the programs or 
activities of a public entity include its performance of practical work. 
The added element of practicality allows for categorization of services, 
programs, and activities that are not directly performed by a public 
entity, but rather are practically services of a public entity, as subject to 
the ADA. 
The federal regulations on nondiscrimination in government 
services ground the ADA and support this interpretation. Section 
35.130(b)(1) says a public entity may not discriminate whether it acts 
directly or “through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.”57 
Section 35.130(b)(1)(6) specifically states a public entity may not 
“administer a licensing or certification program” or “establish 
requirements for the programs or activities of licensees or certified 
entities that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to 
discrimination on the basis of disability.”58 These regulations explicitly 
recognize that the ADA applies to a far broader scope of actions than 
mere direct actions of a public entity. Instead, the ADA prohibition 
against discrimination applies to public entity direct action, public 
services contracted or licensed out to independent entities, and even 
 
all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context”), superseded on other grounds. 
 52.  See Johnson, 151 F.3d at 569 (finding that “the phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ 
encompasses virtually everything that a public entity does”). 
 53.  See Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The legislative 
history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation 
Act be incorporated by reference when interpreting the ADA.”). 
 54.  Barden, 292 F.3d at 1076 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A) (2012)). 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  Operation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1996). 
 57.  28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2012). 
 58.  Id. 
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“other arrangements”59 that presumably create relationships between 
the public and independent entities that have characteristics similar to 
contractor and licensor relationships. 
Section 35.130(b)(1) goes on to say in subsection (v) that a state 
may not “[a]id or perpetuate discrimination against a qualified 
individual with a disability by providing significant assistance to an 
agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of 
disability in providing any aid, benefit, or service to beneficiaries of the 
public entity’s program.”60 Ultimately, whether a private entity’s action 
reasonably and practically constitutes a “program, service, or activity” 
of a public entity turns on the relationship between the two entities. If 
the public entity significantly assists a non-public entity in providing 
any service to the beneficiaries of the public entity’s program, the non-
public entity service must conform to Title II of the ADA to avoid 
violating federal law. 
The DOJ’s Technical Assistance Manual (the Manual) helps 
explain “whether a particular entity that is providing a public service” 
is at least partially subject to Title II of the ADA. It explicitly recognizes 
that private entities with close relationships to public entities may have 
some of its activities affected by the Title II prohibition against 
discrimination.61 The Manual also states that a public entity is not 
responsible for discrimination on the part of a private entity if the 
private entity’s discrimination does not result from a requirement or 
policy established by the public entity.62 One of the Manual’s examples 
explains that where a public entity engages in a joint venture with a 
private entity, the public entity must ensure Title II is met, and the 
private entity must assure Title III is met. Where the standards differ, 
the joint project must meet the “standard that provides the highest 
degree of access to individuals with disabilities.”63 The illustration does 
not focus on the technical relationship between the partners in the joint 
venture, but rather on the fact that the project is one in which the 
parties “act jointly” to achieve a particular goal. 
Another of the Manual’s examples describes a privately owned 
restaurant within a state park that is required to conform to Title II 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(v) (emphasis added). 
 61.  THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 
§ II–1.3000 (1993), http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html [hereinafter ADA MANUAL]. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
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obligations in order to maintain the park’s obligations, despite the 
restaurant not being subject to Title II on its own.64 This example 
illustrates the principle that if a private entity is carrying out activities 
within the structure of a public entity, it must abide by Title II in order 
to assure the public entity can meet its Title II obligations. This example 
also lends support to the idea that activities are subject to Title II if 
crucial enough that the public entity would provide them directly were 
they not licensed to an independent entity. 
This practical inquiry into whether the public entity would provide 
the function if the private entity failed to do has been applied at the 
circuit court level.65 The Second Circuit said the focus of the inquiry to 
determine if the private entity’s service is subject to Title II should not 
be technical or “hair-splitting,” but should instead consider whether the 
function is “a normal function of a governmental entity.”66 Again, the 
regulations strengthen this practically-focused interpretation by stating 
that public entities must operate in a manner such that their programs, 
“when viewed in [their] entirety,” are compliant with Title II.67 The 
ADA’s legislative history supports the same broad and practical 
construction, stating its purpose as to provide a “national mandate to 
end discrimination,” and “bring persons with disabilities into the 
economic and social mainstream of American life.”68 Congress 
explicitly wanted this legislation to “ensure that the Federal 
government plays a central role in enforcing [ADA] standards on 
behalf of individuals with disabilities.”69 Courts have tended to apply 
this construction as, if a public entity is in an arrangement with an 
independent agency to provide services to beneficiaries of the public 
entity’s program, the independent agency must provide those services 
in compliance with the ADA.70 
 
 64.  Id. (requiring the public entity to ensure, by contract, that Title II obligations are met). 
 65.  See Hason v. Med. Bd., 279 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that medical 
licensing is a service, program, or activity for purposes of Title II); see also Bay Area Addiction 
Research & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
zoning is a service, program, or activity for purposes of Title II); Thompson v. Davis, 282 F.3d 
780, 786–87 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a parole hearing is a service, program, or activity for 
purposes of Title II). 
 66.  See Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997), 
superseded on other grounds. 
 67.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2012). 
 68.  H.R. REP. NO. 101–485(II), at 84 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See Reeves v. Queen City Transp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (D. Colo. 1998) (stating 
that the arrangement to provide services to public entity beneficiaries was the crucial factor in 
determining whether Title II applies); see also Indep. Hous. Servs. of S.F. v. Fillmore Ctr. Assocs., 
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III.  HOLDING 
The Fifth Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs in Ivy v. Williams 
were “excluded from participation in or . . . denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of [the TEA].”71 The key determination 
was “whether driver education is a service, program, or activity of the 
TEA.”72 The Fifth Circuit held that it was not, but admittedly made that 
decision with “little concrete guidance” from statutes, regulations, and 
case law.73 Its analysis focused on whether the TEA directly provided 
driver education to its beneficiaries, and it manufactured a distinction 
between the TEA’s responsibility to license and regulate driving 
education schools, and the consequent driver education those schools 
directly provide.74 
In addressing the Rehabilitation Act’s express requirement that 
programs and activities include “all of the operations of” a public 
entity,75 the Fifth Circuit cited the same distinction between directly 
providing driving education and licensing schools to fulfill that precise 
obligation.76 It went on to state that the failure of driving schools to 
comply with the ADA was not a result of the requirements or policies 
established by the TEA, but instead a result of the TEA’s failure to 
establish requirements or policies to ensure nondiscriminatory access 
in driving schools.77 
The court’s decision was largely based on the absence of a 
“contractual or agency relationship” between the private driving 
schools and the TEA.78 The Fifth Circuit decided that previous case law 
emphasized the formal label of “contract” over the practical 
repercussions the contract provides.79 Finally, it acknowledged, but 
largely discounted, that “a driver education certificate—is necessary 
for obtaining an important governmental benefit—a driver’s license,”80 
and only a TEA-licensed driving school can provide that certificate.81 
 
840 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
 71.  Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012)). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2012). 
 76.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 255. 
 77.  Id. at 256. 
 78.  Id. at 257. 
 79.  Id. (citing Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2013) and Indep. Hous. 
Servs. of S.F. v. Fillmore Ctr. Assocs., 840 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). 
 80.  Id. at 258 
 81.  See id. 
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In dissent, Judge Wiener concluded that the regulations, statutes, 
and case law surrounding the ADA clearly indicate the phrase “service, 
program, or activity” applies to the TEA’s licensing of driving 
education to schools in this case.82 He determined that the “TEA does 
in fact engage in the public ‘program’ of driver education,” and thus is 
required to ensure nondiscriminatory access to said program through 
ADA compliance.83 
The dissent emphasized that the Manual specifies Title II 
obligations are triggered when public entities like the TEA have a 
“close relationship to private entities that are covered by Title III.”84 
Judge Wiener stated that there is no indication that close relationship 
should be limited to a contractual or agency relationship, and it would 
be improper to narrow DOJ’s language to force that meaning.85 
Instead, the relationship should be judged on “(1) whether a private 
party services the beneficiaries of the public entity’s program, and (2) 
how extensively the public entity is involved in the functions and 
operations of the private entity.”86 
The dissent stated that instruction by private driving schools is a 
single component of a far “broader program of driver education that is 
continually overseen and regulated in discrete detail by TEA,” which 
includes both driving education and driving safety.87 The TEA is 
substantially involved with the everyday operations of the driving 
schools, further supporting that the driving schools are part of a TEA 
program, so the certificates they offer are a TEA service.88 Though this 
case was remanded with orders to dismiss, defining the circumstances 
that subject a private entity to federal obligations is still significant. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ivy v. Williams turned on a 
prohibitively narrow construction of what the “services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity” includes. The majority opinion attached 
 
 82.  Id. at 259 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 259–60. 
 86.  Id. at 260. 
 87.  See id. 
 88.  See id. at 261–63 (stating the TEA is responsible for overseeing “both driver education 
and driving safety,” and the instruction performed by the driving schools is “but one component 
of the broader program of driver education that is continually overseen and regulated in discrete 
detail by TEA”). 
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meaning to words in the statute’s text without explaining its reasoning, 
and ultimately undermined Congress’s explicit intent for the ADA to 
prohibit discrimination based on disability in federal benefits. Though 
the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot, the underlying issue is 
poignant. Public entities absolving themselves of their obligation to 
provide nondiscriminatory benefits by simply licensing portions of 
their program to private entities is counter to the ADA’s purpose, and 
can be avoided. 
A more appropriate interpretation of Congress’s statement, that 
public services include all services provided by a public entity, would 
look at which services are pragmatically made available because of the 
public entity. To outcast driving schools from the “close relationship” 
requirement that would subject them to federal law, because of the lack 
of a formal contract, would be an inappropriate application of form 
over substance. In practice, the driving schools perform a piece of the 
TEA’s overarching program, and thus fit within the lottery case 
framework that establishes certain private entities must comply with 
federal obligations. 
A.  Defining ‘Provides’ 
The majority opinion determined that Supreme Court precedent 
has interpreted the “services, programs, or activities of a public entity” 
to include all “services, programs, or activities” provided by the public 
entity.89 It went on, however, to assert that the TEA did not provide 
driver education because it did not specifically teach courses or 
contract with the driving schools.90 There is no basis for this limited 
interpretation of the word “provides.” To provide simply means “to 
supply or make available.”91 For the majority opinion to interpret that 
broad definition included only directly offered or contracted services 
contradicts Congress’s express intention to forbid public entities from 
discriminating through “contractual, licensing, or other 
arrangements.”92 It was without a thoughtful foundation that the 
majority opinion rejected this regulation. 
On the other hand, the dissent interpreted “provides” in a more 
commonsensical and contextual manner by considering Texas’s 
 
 89.  Id. at 255 (majority opinion) (citing Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 
(1998)). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Provide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1996). 
 92.  See Williams, 781 F.3d at 256 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added)). 
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overarching policy goal as indicative of the TEA’s responsibilities.93 
Chapter 1001 of the Texas Education Code indicates that the TEA 
supervises a comprehensive driver-training program to bolster Texas’s 
goal of ensuring safe roads.94 When contextualized as a TEA program 
designed to ensure driver safety, it reasonably follows that requiring 
training certificates is a portion of that program.95 Without Texas’s 
policy goals, and the means by which Texas chose to achieve them—a 
TEA system to oversee, regulate, and ensure driver safety—the driver 
education certificates issued by private driving schools would not be 
required. In other words, but for the TEA’s system, the driving schools 
would not have a certificate requirement to fulfill. Thus, the provision 
of driver education certificates is a service “made available” or 
“provided” by the TEA. 
The majority relied on the same restraining construction to 
interpret the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “program or activity” as 
“all of the operations of” a public entity.96 The opinion acknowledged 
that all operations should broadly include “the whole process of 
planning for and operating a business or other organized unit,” but for 
all its talk, it claimed that the TEA’s lack of direct driver education 
courses and contracts exculpated the public entity.97 This reasoning is 
inconsistent with both the commonsense meaning of “all operations,” 
as well as the ADA’s policy goals to eliminate discrimination.98 If the 
majority opinion had considered the TEA’s actual role in the services 
delivered by Texas’s private driving schools, it would have been unable 
to meaningfully distinguish the issuance of a required driving 
certificate from other services the TEA provides. 
B.  Defining ‘Close Relationship’ 
The TEA’s role in private driving schools is characterized by an 
“inextricably intertwined” relationship,99 which fulfills the close 
relationship requirement the Manual indicates triggers Title II 
obligations on a private entity.100 Determining the relationship between 
 
 93.  See id. at 263–64 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 94.  See generally 5 Tex. Educ. Code § 1001 (West 2015) (establishing state-mandated driver 
education certificates, driving safety courses, drug and alcohol awareness programs, driver’s 
license regulations, etc). 
 95.  See id. 
 96.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2012). 
 97.  See Williams, 781 F.3d at 255. 
 98.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. (2012). 
 99.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 260 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 100.  ADA MANUAL, supra note 61.  
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the TEA and private driving schools is not close because there is no 
formal contract is an unsophisticated application of form over 
substance. 
The pervasive power the TEA has to regulate the manner in which 
its public service, preparing drivers to safely operate vehicles on Texas 
roads, is delivered makes its relationship to driving schools dependent 
and unique.101 The TEA must approve every driving school’s 
curriculum and textbooks and may order a peer review of any school 
to assure it meets the state’s standards. Texas Education Code § 
1001.204(9) also requires that the owners and instructors of driver 
education schools be of “good reputation and character.”102 To become 
licensed, the driver education schools must post a bond payable to the 
TEA to ultimately be used to refund students.103 Up until 2015, the 
TEA also had the authority to inspect any school “physically at least 
once a year as a condition of license renewal.”104 And it closely 
regulates the substance, personnel, materials, and physicality of the 
driver education schools and can determine the issuer of the public 
service of driver education by choosing which to license. Though no 
formal contract exists, in practice, the TEA provides the programming 
that prepares young drivers to drive safely, and driver education 
schools issue a formal recognition of such preparation in the form of a 
certificate. 
C.  Relevance of Lottery Cases 
This conception of Texas’s driver education and preparation 
program directly contradicts the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that Ivy v. 
Williams does not fit the logic of two lottery cases, which each found 
that when a private entity performs a piece of a state entity’s program, 
it must conform to the ADA.105 No court has addressed a case precisely 
like Ivy v. Williams, in which a state determined a mandatory certificate 
was necessary to obtain a state benefit, and deliverance of that 
certificate was delegated by a state agency to a private business.106 But 
in the lottery context, a situation in which “a state is extensively 
 
 101.  See 5 Tex. Educ. Code § 1001.051 (West 2015). 
 102.  Id. § 1001.204(9). 
 103.  Id. § 1001.207. 
 104.  See Williams, 781 F.3d at 262; see also 5 Tex. Educ. Code § 1001.303 (repealed 2015). 
 105.  See Williams, 781 F.3d at 256 (majority opinion) (citing Winborne v. Va. Lottery, 677 
S.E.2d 304, 307–08 (Va. 2009) and Paxton v. State Dep’t of Tax & Revenue, 451 S.E.2d 779, 784–
85 (W. Va. 1994)). 
 106.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Ivy v. Morath, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (No. 15-486). 
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involved in a program with strong parallels to driver education . . . 
courts have unanimously held that a public agency in charge of a lottery 
program bears Title II liability.”107 
Before dismissing Ivy v. Williams for mootness, the Fifth Circuit 
decided that this case differed from the lottery cases because (1) the 
agents selling lottery tickets were carrying out one component of the 
public lottery commission’s program, and (2) there existed a contract 
between the agents and the commissions.108 The court failed, however, 
to support the first assertion with facts from the record. And it failed to 
justify why the absence of a contract should be—unprecedentedly and 
contra-statutorily—dispositive. 
The first assertion relied on the assumption that driver education 
certificates issued solely by TEA-licensed driving schools were not a 
benefit of the TEA’s program to assure driver education and 
preparation.109 But the Texas Transportation Code requires young 
drivers have the certificate to obtain a license,110 it permits only TEA-
licensed driving schools to issue the certificates,111 and it grants the 
TEA complete control over whether a particular driving school may 
issue a certificate—by giving it the authority to choose whether to 
license a school.112 The TEA’s practical control and total discretion 
regarding where these certificates are issued proves a dependent 
relationship between the TEA and the driving schools.113 The 
certificates are required by state law, so if the driving schools did not 
exist, the TEA would presumably determine another venue to issue the 
certificates. The entity essential to and responsible for getting driving 
certificates issued is the TEA; the driving schools are merely a means 
to a state-mandated end. 
Although TEA-licensed driving schools are not required to 
conform to the ADA simply because they are licensed by the TEA,114 
even the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “a public entity cannot 
discriminate ‘directly or through contractual, licensing, or other 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 256–57. 
 109.  See id. (stating TEA does not provide any portion of driver education). 
 110.  7 Tex. Transp. Code § 521.1601 (West 2015). 
 111.  See 5 Tex. Educ. Code § 1001.055(a) (West 2015). 
 112.  Id. § 1001.201 (stating no school may operate as a driver education or safety school 
without being licensed). 
 113.  See generally id. § 1001.  
 114.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (2012) (“The programs or activities of entities that are 
licensed or certified by a public entity are not, themselves, covered [by the ADA].”). 
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arrangements.’”115 The inquiry, then, is ultimately whether the 
certificates are available because of a decision made by the driving 
schools, or because the TEA has determined they shall be issued. But, 
by giving the TEA complete “jurisdiction over and control of driver 
training schools,” Texas law makes it clear that driver training schools 
are not autonomous.116 The TEA is the mastermind behind Texas’s 
driver education, and would find an alternative way to issue certificates 
if driving schools were not an option. Therefore, the certificates are a 
benefit of TEA programming. And because the certificates are a 
benefit of TEA programming, discrimination in their issuance is by a 
public entity “through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements,” 
and thus must be subject to the ADA.117 
The Transportation Code specifically states that the certificate is 
required for young drivers to obtain a license,118 and the idea that the 
TEA would not find a way to effectuate certificate issuance to conform 
with Texas law if driving schools did not issue certificates is absurd. The 
critical entity providing the certificates is the TEA. Driving schools are 
merely the selected method for effectuating the TEA’s mandate. This 
framework supports the theory that driving schools are performing a 
portion of the TEA’s overarching program to prepare and educate 
drivers in Texas, and undercuts the Fifth Circuit’s first reason for why 
this case fundamentally differed from the lottery cases. 
If the above argument is accepted, then the Fifth Circuit’s second 
assertion distinguishing this case from the lottery cases is easily 
debunked. Section 35.130(b)(1)(v) specifically tells us that “a public 
entity cannot discriminate against qualified individuals with disabilities 
‘in providing any aid, benefit, or service,’ whether the state acts ‘directly 
or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.’”119 Asserting 
that a formal contract is the only arrangement that subjects private 
entities to ADA compliance ignores the explicit language of the federal 
statute. In reality, “[t]he crucial distinction” that renders a public entity 
liable for discrimination by a private entity is whether the private entity 
is meant to provide benefits to beneficiaries of the public entity’s 
program.120 Here, the beneficiaries of the TEA’s driver education and 
 
 115.  See Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250, 258 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) 
(2012)). 
 116.  See 5 Tex. Educ. Code § 1001.051. 
 117.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(v). 
 118.  7 Tex. Transp. Code § 521.1601 (West 2015). 
 119.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 255 (quoting § 35.130(b)(1)). 
 120.  See Indep. Hous. Servs. of S.F. v. Fillmore Ctr. Assocs., 840 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 (N.D. 
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safety program are Texas drivers who experience decreased danger 
while driving because of section 1001, and the benefit is the driver 
certificate that enables young drivers to participate in the program of 
safer drivers that the TEA has created. Driving schools are directly 
providing the benefit of participation in a safer, TEA-regulated, driver 
community, and that benefit exists because of the TEA’s program. 
In order to minimize the salience of section 35.130’s explicit 
instruction that public entities may not discriminate by delegating its 
functions to a private entity, the Fifth Circuit misapplied DOJ’s 
interpretative guidance. The DOJ Technical Manual states that private 
entities licensed by public entities are accountable for discrimination 
under Title II if the private entities’ practices are the “result of 
requirements or policies established by the [public entity].”121 The Fifth 
Circuit claimed that in this case, “failure of the driver education schools 
to comply with the ADA or Rehabilitation Act” was not the result of 
TEA requirements or policies, but rather a result of the TEA’s failure 
to establish requirements and policies to protect against the driving 
school discrimination.122 This argument assumed that the driver 
education schools are not subject to Title II, and that they are only 
prohibited from discriminating if the TEA prohibits them. Based on the 
schools’ issuance of TEA benefits (i.e. the certificates), however, the 
schools are directly responsible for assuring nondiscriminatory access 
to the benefits. TEA policy need not independently require that its 
licensees act non-discriminatorily because federal law already makes it 
explicit that TEA benefits cannot be distributed in a discriminatory 
way, regardless of whether the entity distributing the benefits is public, 
or private.123 
DOJ’s guidance applies to the TEA requirement that driving 
schools issue certificates. The driver education schools’ issuance of 
certificates to young drivers is a direct result of the TEA’s requirement 
that all young drivers present a certificate from a licensed driving 
school in order to obtain a license. Thus, the private entity’s practice of 
distributing benefits of a public entity is unquestionably the “result” of 
a policy established by the public entity—the policy demanding young 
drivers get a certificate before they may obtain a license. 
 
Cal. 1993). 
 121.  ADA MANUAL, supra note 61. 
 122.  Williams, 781 F.3d at 256. 
 123.  See § 35.130(b)(1)(v). 
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CONCLUSION 
By permitting Texas driver education schools to deny certificates to 
all young deaf people by failing to provide ASL accommodations, the 
Fifth Circuit undermined the explicit federal goal of prohibiting 
discrimination based on disability laid out in the ADA. Though the 
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot, the underlying issue 
remains relevant. Public entities may not absolve themselves of their 
obligation to provide benefits without discrimination by simply 
licensing portions of their program to private entities. 
Here, the TEA comprehensively provides for the education and 
safety of drivers in Texas. The public agency has control over the 
substance, personnel, materials, and physicality of driver education 
schools. Though driver education schools technically issue the 
certificates necessary to obtain drivers licenses, the schools issue these 
certificates because the TEA determined that the certificates must be 
issued as part of its comprehensive program to make Texas roads safer. 
The Fifth Circuit’s original determination that the driver education 
schools were not subject to Title II of the ADA manufactured 
nonexistent independence for the schools. But in reality, the schools 
carry out a critical portion of the TEA’s program. As such, they must 
do so nondiscriminatorily. 
The issue of determining what private entity activities are subject 
to federal anti-discrimination law will inevitably make its way back up 
to the Supreme Court. When it does, the Court must look holistically at 
the relationship between the public and private entity to determine the 
true source of the benefit. If the responsible party is the public agency, 
benefits must be distributed according to federal law. 
